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Prologue
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem is one of the greatest landmarks in the history of logic. It shows, by
an ingenious arithmetization of the language and an extensive use of the idea of recursiveness, the existence
of arithmetical sentences that can be neither proved nor refuted. This work is structured with the help of
more or less intuitive questions, which will guide us along the proof of this theorem, and also through some
of its fundamental consequences. Moreover, for the sake of clarity, we have highlighted the propositions with
a blue stripe in the margin.
The exposition is organized in four chapters:
• The first chapter is a crash course in logic, which intends to present the essential concepts necessary
for the understanding of what follows.
• In the second chapter, Peano arithmetic is introduced, a formal system which will provide us with the
framework for our discussion.
• The third chapter is the most technical. We introduce in it our main tool, recursiveness. Also, the con-
cept of an expressible relation and that of a representable function (which intuitevely can be described
as the relations and functions over the natural numbers such that, when they hold, Peano arithmetic
gives account of this fact), and it is proved that recursive relations are expressible and that recursive
functions are representable.
• The fourth and final chapter is without doubt the most interesting. Having introduced all the re-
quired notions in the previous chapters, we encode sentences about arithmetic as arithmetic sentences
themselves by means of Gödel’s arithmetization, answering questions raised along the exposition, and
allowing us to reach our main goal of proving Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem.
The first two chapters follow the lines of [Hamilton], while the last two follow those of [Mendelson].
I would like to thank professor Carlos Gómez Ambrosi for the direction of this work. His willingness and
motivation have allowed to me to learn a lot.
I would also like to give thanks to all the people who have encouraged me during my degree, and specially
my mother, Esperanza, for her continuous support. I would like to dedicate this work to her.
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Resumen en español
(Summary in Spanish)
Este trabajo está estructurado en cuatro capítulos:
• El primer capítulo es un resumen de lógica, dividido a su vez en tres secciones:
◦ La primera sección trata de lógica proposicional. Aunque no es estrictamente necesaria para
la posterior exposición, se ha incluido pues permite una aproximación más intuitiva a nociones de
mayor generalidad que se definirán a partir de la siguiente sección.
El resultado más importante que se comenta aquí es el teorema de completitud de la lógica
proposicional, que nos asegura cómo obtener las «verdades» de la lógica proposicional, llamadas
tautologías, como teoremas formales, es decir, como cadenas de símbolos mecánicamente deriv-
ables a partir de ciertas cadenas especiales, los axiomas, mediante aplicaciones de reglas de
inferencia.
Además, mediante la introducción de las tablas de verdad, se evidencia la posibilidad de resolver
algorítmicamente los problemas de la lógica proposicional.
◦ En la segunda sección se presenta la lógica de predicados. Esta lógica supone una generalización
de la proposicional, más sofisticada, ya que permite la posibilidad de cuantificar los objetos que
intervienen en sus enunciados.
El concepto esencial para dar una definición de veracidad será el concepto de modelo, que puede
verse como una subteoría de la teoría de conjuntos en la que los teoremas formales de un sistema
formal son verdaderos.
Al igual que en la lógica proposicional, se muestra un teorema de completitud, el teorema de
completitud de Gödel, referente esta vez a las «verdades» de la lógica de predicados, llamadas
fórmulas lógicamente válidas, y con la certeza de este resultado, se construyen los llamados
sistemas de primer orden.
Sin embargo, se adelanta que aceptando la (razonable) definición de algoritmo conocida como tesis
de Church, es imposible resolver algorítmicamente todos los problemas de la lógica de predicados,
dando así respuesta negativa al célebre problema de la decisión.
También se definen los fundamentales conceptos de consistencia (imposibilidad de que un enun-
ciado y su negación sean simultáneamente teoremas) y completitud (inexistencia de sentencias
indecidibles, es decir, sentencias que no pueden ser demostradas ni refutadas).
Es especialmente interesante la caracterización de la consistencia que se enuncia, indicando
que un sistema de primer orden es consistente si, y sólo si, posee un modelo.
◦ En la tercera sección se definen los sistemas de primer orden con igualdad, que buscan
plasmar formalmente la noción de igualdad.
El mayor interés de la sección radica en la observación de que no todo modelo de un sistema de
primer orden con igualdad interpreta exactamente la igualdad, sino sólo una relación de equiva-
lencia. Los modelos que consiguen expresar la igualdad se denominan modelos normales, y se
muestra una forma de determinarlos, supuesta la consistencia.
• El segundo capítulo contiene la definición del sistema formal de la aritmética, que pretende servir
como base para el análisis formal de la teoría de números.
3
4Se comenta aquí la consistencia de dicho sistema formal y se demuestra que cumple una propiedad más
fuerte, la ω-consistencia. Asegurada ya la consistencia, se define el modelo estándar.
Además, se avanza el teorema de incompletitud de Gödel, que pone de manifiesto la existencia de
sentencias indecidibles en la aritmética, y se demuestra la existencia de modelos normales para la
aritmética esencialmente diferentes.
• El tercer capítulo es el más técnico. Consta de tres secciones:
◦ En la primera sección se definen las relaciones recursivas y las funciones recursivas, listando
bastante de ellas, tanto porque serán herramienta esencial para demostrar los resultados del último
capítulo, como porque su conocimiento puede ser útil en diversos campos de las matemáticas.
◦ La segunda sección se centra en un tipo especial de recursión, la recursión completa, que también
será necesaria para demostrar resultados posteriores.
◦ En la tercera sección se definen los conceptos de relación expresable y función representable
(que intuitivamente podemos describir como las relaciones y operaciones sobre números naturales
tales que, al verificarse, inducen teoremas formales en el sistema formal de la aritmética), y se
demuestra que las relaciones recursivas son expresables, así como que las las funciones
recursivas son representables.
• El cuarto capítulo da respuesta a varios interrogantes planteados durante el trabajo. Se halla segmen-
tado en cuatro secciones:
◦ La primera sección muestra la aritmetización de Gödel, que permite codificar proposiciones
referentes a la consistencia y completitud de la aritmética como enunciados aritméticos.
◦ En la segunda sección se procede a demostrar el teorema del punto fijo, un resultado técnico
aunque muy llamativo, y el teorema de incompletitud de Gödel.
◦ En la tercera sección se comenta otro resultado especialmente interesante, el Segundo Teorema
de Gödel, que advierte de la imposibilidad de que la aritmética, por medio de la aritmeti-
zación de Gödel, pueda demostrar su propia consistencia.
◦ Finalmente, en la cuarta sección, identificando la idea de «procedimiento algorítmico» con «pro-
cedimiento recursivo» (Tesis de Church), se evidencia la importancia de la recursividad, definiendo
los conceptos de axiomatizabilidad recursiva y de decidibilidad recursiva, y se demuestra
que la aritmética es recursivamente indecidible.
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Chapter 1
Preliminaries on logic
It is well-known that set theory is the set of theorems about sets, like arithmetic is the set of theorems
about numbers, but...
Is there any mathematical theory which is the set of theorems about theorems?
Yes, such theory is logic. We begin its study by introducing its very beginnings, namely propositional
logic.
1.1 Propositional logic
First, we define statement variables as letters which stand for arbitrary and unspecified statements,
but always under the assumption that they are either true or false.
Given a statement variable p, ¬p stands for the negation of p, and it should be intuitively acceptable
that ¬p is true iff p is false. We can describe the situation by a truth table (the value T is assigned to a
statement variable if the statement it stands for is true, and F otherwise):
p ¬p
F T
T F
Other connectives can be considered similarly:
Conjunction
symbol: ∧
Disjunction
symbol: ∨
Conditional
symbol: →
Biconditional
symbol: ↔
Interpretation p∧q stands for
«P and Q»
p∨q stands for
«P or Q»
p → q stands for
«If P then Q»
p ↔ q stands for
«P if and only if Q»
Truth
table
p q p ∧ q
F F F
F T F
T F F
T T T
p q p ∨ q
F F F
F T T
T F T
T T T
p q p→ q
F F T
F T T
T F F
T T T
p q p↔ q
F F T
F T F
T F F
T T T
Notice that connectives determine truth functions, whose graph is determined by the truth table.
A statement form is a string of symbols inductively defined by the following rules: 1
1Logic’s concepts, in particular inductive definitions, can be re-stated in terms of algebraic structures. An excel-
lent introduction to algebraic logic can be found in [Amor] (in Spanish), and for further reading we refer the reader to
[Burris & Sankappanavar] and [Rasiowa].
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1. Every statement variable is a statement form.
2. Given statement forms α and β, ¬α, α ∧ β, α ∨ β, α→ β and α↔ β are statement forms.
3. The set of statement forms is generated by rules 1 and 2.
For example, (p ∧ q)→ ¬(q ∨ r) is a statement form.
Two statement forms α and β are logically equivalent, in whose case we use the notation α ≡ β, iff
they represent the same truth function, i.e. iff the last column of their truth tables is the same. For example:
• Principle of double negation: ¬¬p ≡ p.
• De Morgan’s laws:
◦ ¬(p ∧ q) ≡ ¬p ∨ ¬q.
◦ ¬(p ∨ q) ≡ ¬p ∧ ¬q.
• Every statement form is logically equivalent to one in which only the negation and conditional symbols
occur, since:
◦ p ∧ q ≡ ¬(p→ ¬q).
◦ p ∨ q ≡ ¬p→ q.
◦ p↔ q ≡ ¬((p→ q)→ ¬(q → p)).
A statement form is a tautology iff its corresponding truth function takes only the value T, i.e. iff the
last column of its truth table contains only T’s. For example, q → (¬p→ q) is a tautology:
p q ¬p p→ q ¬p→ (p→ q)
F F T T T
F T T T T
T F F F T
T T F T T
Notice that, given statement forms α and β, α ≡ β iff α ↔ β is a tautology. For example, ¬¬p↔ p is a
tautology.
«Tautology» is the central notion of propositional logic, since tautologies are the «truths» of propositional
logic. For example, the law of excluded middle can be stated by saying that p ∨ ¬p is a tautology.
Is it possible to find an algorithm that decides if a statement form is a tautology?
Yes, it suffices to write its truth table and check whether the last column contains only T’s.
Is it possible to obtain all the «truths» of propositional logic (tautologies) as formal theorems, i.e. as
strings of symbols mechanically derivable from some distinghished strings (called axioms) by means of
certain rules?
The answer to this question is yes, as it will be made apparent at the end of this section. But first, we
need to formalize some of the previous ideas.
Well-formed formulas (wffs), inductively defined by the following rules:
1. Every statement variable is a wff.
2. Given wffs α and β, ¬α and α→ β are wffs.
3. The set of wffs is generated by rules 1 and 2.
A formal system, consists of a non-empty set of wffs, called axioms, and a set of partial operations
over the set of wffs, called inference rules.
Next, we introduce the formal system L in the following way:
• Its axioms are defined by the following rules:
1. Given wffs α and β, α→ (β → α) is an axiom.
Lorenzo Sauras Altuzarra
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2. Given wffs α, β, γ, (α→ (β → γ))→ ((α→ β)→ (α→ γ)) is an axiom.
3. Given wffs α and β, (¬α→ ¬β)→ (β → α) is an axiom.
• Its only inference rule is modus ponens (MP): for every α, β ∈ L, it associates α and α→ β with β.
Given wffs α1, ..., αn of L, αn is a theorem of L and 〈α1, ..., αn〉 is a proof of αn in L iff, for every
i ∈ {1, ..., n}, αi is an axiom or αi follows by MP from previous components of the sequence. For example,
for every wffs α and β of L, ¬α→ (α→ β) is a theorem of L:
(1) ¬α→ (¬β → ¬α) (L1)
(2) (¬β → ¬α)→ (α→ β) (L3)
(3) ((¬β → ¬α)→ (α→ β))→ (¬α→ ((¬β → ¬α)→ (α→ β))) (L1)
(4) ¬α→ ((¬β → ¬α)→ (α→ β)) MP(2, 3)
(5) (¬α→ ((¬β → ¬α)→ (α→ β)))→ ((¬α→ (¬β → ¬α))→ (¬α→ (α→ β))) (L2)
(6) (¬α→ (¬β → ¬α))→ (¬α→ (α→ β)) MP(4, 5)
(7) ¬α→ (α→ β) MP(1, 6)
We can finally state the completeness theorem for propositional logic: the tautologies are precisely the
theorems of L (for the proof, see Propositions 2.14 and 2.23 of [Hamilton]).
Is it possible to go deeper in logic, expressing formally the intuitive idea of quantification?
Yes, and this gives rise to a new subtheory, called predicate logic.
1.2 Predicate logic
Now we build a more sophisticated language, one capable of quantifying the objects involved in its
statements. In order to do that, we introduce:
• The symbol ∀, called the universal quantifier and read «for all».
• For any m ∈ N+, the symbol cm, called the m-th constant.
• For any m,n ∈ N+, the symbol fnm, called the m-th n-ary function letter.
• For any m,n ∈ N+, the symbol Anm, called the m-th n-ary predicate letter.
• Terms, inductively defined by the following rules:
1. Every constant is a term.
2. Every variable is a term.
3. Given terms t1, ..., tn, fnm(t1, ..., tn) is a term.
4. The set of terms is generated by rules 1, 2 and 3.
For example, f11 (f22 (x1, f31 (c1, c1, x5))) is a term.
• Atomic formulas, which are those of the form Anm(t1, ..., tn), where t1, ..., tn are terms.
• Well-formed formulas (wffs), inductively defined by the following rules:
1. Every atomic formula is a wff.
2. Given wffs α and β, ∀ xm α, ¬α and α→ β are wffs.
3. The set of wffs is generated by rules 1 and 2.
Then, some useful notations are introduced:
• ¬(α→ ¬β) is denoted by α ∧ β.
• ¬α→ β is denoted by α ∨ β.
• ¬((α→ β)→ ¬(β → α)) is denoted by α↔ β.
• ¬∀ xm ¬α is denoted by ∃ xm α. ∃ is called the existential quantifier and read «there is».
Given Σ ⊆ {cm, Anm, fnm}m,n∈N+ such that there is at least one predicate letter contained in Σ (Σ is
called an alphabet), {α wff | for every s ∈ {cm, Anm, fnm}m,n∈N+ such that s occurs in α, s ∈ Σ} is called
first-order language on Σ, and is denoted by LΣ. Nevertheless, in most of our work we shall not need to
specify which alphabet we are using, so we will denote the language simply by L .
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Given a wff a1 · · · ar (written as a string of symbols) and j ∈ {1, ..., r}, xm occurs free at the jth position
of a1 · · · ar iff xm occurs without quantification in the j-th position, i.e. iff:
• aj is xm.
• There are not i, k ∈ {1, ..., r} such that:
◦ i < j < k.
◦ ai is ∀.
◦ ai+1 is xm.
◦ xm occurs in ai · · · ak.
◦ ai · · · ak is a wff.
For example, x2 occurs free in the 8th position of ∀ x1 (A21(x1, x2)→ ∀ x3 ∀ x1 ∀ x2 A21(x1, x2)) (commas
are counted), and in this wff there are no more free occurrences of any variable.
A wff in which no variable occurs free is called a sentence. Given α ∈ L , the closure of α is the
sentence obtained by prefixing with universal quantifiers those variables, in order of descending subscripts,
that occur free in some position of α. For example, the closure of A21(x2, x5) → ¬∀ x2 A31(x1, x2, x3) is
∀ x5 ∀ x3 ∀ x2 ∀ x1 (A21(x2, x5)→ ¬∀ x2 A31(x1, x2, x3)).
Now we proceed to define the concept of truth, «translating» wffs into propositions about sets:
• An interpretation I of L consists of:
◦ A nonempty set DI , called the domain of I.
◦ A function CI such that, for every constant cm of L 2, CI(cm) ∈ DI .
◦ A function FI such that, for every function letter fnm of L , FI(fnm) is an n-ary function over DI .
◦ A function PI such that, for every predicate letter Anm of L , PI(Anm) is an n-ary relation over DI .
• Given an interpretation I, a valuation of I is a function v from the set of terms of L to the set DI
such that:
◦ Given a constant cm of L , v(cm) = CI(cm).
◦ Given a function letter fnm of L and t1, ..., tn terms of L ,
v(fnm(t1, ..., tn)) = FI(f
n
m)(v(t1), ..., v(tn)).
A valuation assigns to each term in L the object in DI which is to be its interpretation, and assigns
an element of DI to each of the variables xm of L . We can now define inductively what is meant for
a wff to be true with respect to a given valuation:
◦ Given a predicate letter Anm of L , Anm(t1, ..., tn) is v-true iff 〈v(t1), ..., v(tn)〉 ∈ PI(Anm).
◦ Given α ∈ L , ¬α is v-true iff α is not v-true.
◦ Given α, β ∈ L , α→ β is v-true iff ¬β or α are v-true.
◦ Given α ∈ L , ∀ xm α is v-true iff, for every valuation w of I such that, for every M ∈ N+\{m},
w(xM ) = v(xM ), α is w-true.
For example, let Σ := {c1, A21, f21 , f22 } and I an interpretation such that DI = N+, CI(c1) = 0, PI(A21)
is equality, FI(f21 ) is addition and FI(f22 ) is multiplication.
◦ If v is a valuation such that v(x1) = 2, v(x2) = 6, v(x3) = 3 and v(x4) = 4,
A21(f
2
1 (x1, x2), f
2
2 (x3, x4)) is v-true, since 2 · 6 = 3 · 4.
◦ If v is a valuation such that v(x1) = 1, v(x2) = 5, v(x3) = 4 and v(x4) = 2,
A21(f
2
1 (x1, x2), f
2
2 (x3, x4)) is not v-true, since 1 · 5 6= 4 · 2.
◦ Let v be a valuation such that v(x1) = 0.
Hence, A21(x1, c1) is v-true.
Let w be a valuation such that, for every M ∈ N+\{1}, w(xM ) = v(xM ) but w(x1) 6= v(x1).
Hence, A21(x1, c1) is not w-true, since w(x1) 6= 0.
Therefore, ∀ x1 A21(x1, c1) is not v-true.
• Finally, given an interpretation I and α ∈ L , we define:
◦ α is true in I iff, for every valuation v of I, α is v-true.
◦ α is false in I iff there is no valuation v of I such that α is v-true.
For example, let Σ := {A21, f21 }, let α be to ∀ x1 ∀ x2 ∃ x3 A21(f21 (x1, x3), x2):
2That is, more formally, such that cm ∈ Σ.
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◦ If I is an interpretation such that DI = Q+, FI(f21 ) is multiplication and PI(A21) is equality, α is
true in I, since for every m,n ∈ Q+ there is p ∈ Q+ such that m · p = n.
◦ If J is an interpretation such that DJ = N+, FJ(f21 ) is multiplication and PJ(A21) is equality, α is
false in J , since there are m,n ∈ N+ such that there is no p ∈ N+ such that m · p = n.
Notice that:
• To be false is stronger than not to be true.
• A wff is false iff its negation is true.
• Since the domain of an interpretation is non-empty, it is impossible for a wff to be both true and
false in a given interpretation.
• Every sentence is true or false. Therefore, it or its negation are true (for the proof, see Corollary
3.34 of [Hamilton]).
Given α ∈ L , α is logically valid iff α is true in every interpretation. For example, given α ∈ L :
• α∨¬α is logically valid (in fact, every wff which is a substitution instance of a tautology of propositional
logic is logically valid (for the proof, see Proposition 3.31 of [Hamilton])).
• ∀ xm α→ ∃ xm α is logically valid (for the proof, see Example 3.37.b of [Hamilton]).
Logically valid wffs play the same role in predicate logic as tautologies in propositional logic, i.e. logically
valid wffs are the «truths» of predicate logic.
(Entscheidungsproblem) Like in propositional logic, is it possible to find an algorithm which can
decide if a sentence is logically valid?
If we accept the definition of «algorithm» provided by Church’s Thesis, the answer is negative. We will
get back to this question in the last chapter.
Like in propositional logic, is it possible to obtain all the «truths» of predicate logic (logically valid
wffs) as formal theorems?
The answer to this question is yes, as it will be made apparent again at the end of this section. But first
we need to introducte some concepts.
Given a wff a1 · · · ar (written as a string of symbols) and a term t1 · · · ts (written as a string of symbols),
and denoting a1 · · · ar and u1 · · ·us by α and t respectively, t is free for xm in α iff xm can be replaced
by t in its free occurrences in α without new interactions with quantifiers, i.e. iff for every i ∈ {1, ..., r}
such that xm occurs free in the ith position of α, for every j ∈ {1, ..., s} such that there is M ∈ N+ such
that tj is xM , xM occurs free in the (i − 1 + j)th position of a1 · · · ai−1u1 · · ·usai+1 · · · ar. For example, in
∀ x1 A21(x1, x2)→ ∀ x3 A22(x3, x1):
• x1 is free for x1 (every variable is free for itself).
• x2 is free for x1, but f21 (x1, x3) is not.
• f22 (x2, x3) is free for x2, but f23 (x1, x4) is not.
• f23 (x1, x4) is free for x3 (this is vacuously true, because x3 does not occur free).
Notice also that every constant is free for every variable in every wff.
Given α ∈ L and a term t free for xm in α, we denote by αxmt the wff obtained by replacing in α all the
free occurrences (if there are any) of xm by t.
Now we introduce the formal system KL :
• Its axioms are defined by the following rules:
1. (K1) Given α, β ∈ L , α→ (β → α) is an axiom.
2. (K2) Given α, β, γ ∈ L , (α→ (β → γ))→ ((α→ β)→ (α→ γ)) is an axiom.
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3. (K3) Given α, β ∈ L , (¬α→ ¬β)→ (β → α) is an axiom.
4. (K4) Given α ∈ L and a term t free for xm in α, ∀ xm α→ αxmt is an axiom.
5. (K5) Given α, β ∈ L such that there are no free occurrences of xm in α,
∀ xm (α→ β)→ (α→ ∀ xm β) is an axiom.
• Its inference rules are:
◦ Modus ponens (MP): for every α, β ∈ L , it associates α and α→ β with β.
◦ Generalization with respect to xm (Gen): for every α ∈ L , it associates α with ∀ xm α.
KL has some useful inference rules which can be derived from the previous ones and which will be useful
in subsequent chapters (see [Mendelson]):
• Existential Rule E4: given α ∈ L and a term t free for xm in α, if αxmt is a theorem of KL , then
∃ xm α is also a theorem of KL .
• Conjunction Introduction: for every α1, ..., αn which are theorems of KL , α1 ∧ ... ∧ αn is a
theorem of KL .
• Conjunction Elimination: for every α1, ..., αn ∈ L such that α1 ∧ ... ∧ αn is a theorem of KL ,
for every i ∈ {1, ..., n}, αi is a theorem of KL .
• Biconditional Introduction: for every α, β ∈ L such that α → β and β → α are theorems of
KL , α↔ β is a theorem of KL .
• Biconditional Elimination: for every α, β ∈ L such that α↔ β is a theorem of KL :
◦ If α is a theorem of KL , β is a theorem of KL .
◦ If ¬α is a theorem of KL , ¬β is a theorem of KL .
• Rule C: for every α ∈ L and Γ ⊆ L , α is deducible from Γ by Rule C iff there are α1, ..., αn ∈ L
such that:
◦ αn is α.
◦ Given i ∈ {1, ..., n}, one of the following conditions holds:
1. αi is an axiom of KL .
2. αi ∈ Γ.
3. αi follows by MP or Gen from previous wffs in the sequence.
4. There is a preceeding wff αk of 〈α1, ..., αn〉 such that there is β ∈ L such that αk is ∃ xm β
and there is a new constant c such that βxmc is αi (Rule C).
◦ As axioms in condition 1, we can also use all axioms that involve the new constants already
introduced by applications of condition 4.
◦ No application of Gen is made using a variable that is free in some wff of the form ∃ xm β to
which Rule C has been previously applied.
◦ α contains none of the new constants introduced in any application of Rule C.
There is no harm in eventually adding new constants with the Rule C, because if α is deducible in
KL from Γ by Rule C, α is deducible in KL from Γ with no need of such constants (see Proposition
2.9 of [Mendelson]).
We can state the Gödel’s Completeness Theorem: the logically valid wffs of L are precisely the
theorems of KL (see Propositions 4.5. and 4.39. of [Hamilton]).
Given a first-order system E:
• Another formal system F is an extension of E iff every theorem of E is also a theorem of F .
• An interpretation I is a model of a E iff every theorem of E is true in I. In fact, I is a model for E
iff every axiom of E is true in I (see Proposition 4.41 of [Hamilton]).
Notice that, since the theorems of KL are the logically valid wffs, every interpretation is a model of KL .
Therefore, the notion of model will get more significance with certain extensions of KL , extensions in which
there will appear new and interesting theorems, but in which not every interpretation will be a model.
An extension E of KL obtained by enlarging the set of axioms of KL is called a first-order system.
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Given a first-order system E, Γ ⊆ L and α1, ..., αn ∈ L , αn is deducible in E from Γ and 〈α1, ..., αn〉 is
a deduction of αn in E from Γ iff, for every i ∈ {1, ..., n}, αi is an axiom, αi ∈ Γ or αi follows by inference
rules of E from previous components of the sequence.
We have the Deduction Theorem (see Proposition 4.8 of [Hamilton]): given a first-order system E,
Γ ⊆ L and α, β ∈ L , α→ β is deducible in E from Γ if:
• β is deducible in E from Γ ∪ {α}.
• If there is a deduction 〈β1, ..., βn〉 of β in E from Γ ∪ {α} such that n > 1 and such that there is a
variable xm which occurs free at some position of α, there is no i ∈ {1, ..., r − 1} such that βi+1 is
∀ xm βi.
Thus, it is clear that, if α is a sentence, α → β is deducible in E from Γ iff β is deducible in E from
Γ ∪ {α}.
Given a first-order system E:
• E is consistent iff for no wff are both it and its negation simultaneously theorems of E.
Notice that the following conditions are equivalent:
◦ E is consistent.
◦ There is a wff which is not a theorem of E (see Proposition 2.18 of [Hamilton]).
◦ E has a model (see Proposition 4.42 of [Hamilton]).
• E is complete iff every sentence is decidable in E, i.e. iff for every sentence, it or its negation is a
theorem of E.
KL is consistent (see Corollary 4.6 of [Hamilton]).
KL is incomplete.
Proof
Let Aki ∈ Σ (remember that Σ contains at least one predicate letter). Neither ∀ x1 ... ∀ xk Aki (x1, ..., xk)
nor ¬∀ x1 ...∀ xk Aki (x1, ..., xk) are theorems of KL , since it is always possible to find a non-empty set D
such that there are A ⊆ Dk and d1, ..., dk, d˜1, ..., d˜k ∈ D such that 〈d1, ..., dk〉 ∈ A and 〈d˜1, ..., d˜k〉 /∈ A.

The following step is to formalize the notion of equality.
1.3 First-order systems with equality
From now on, we will assume that the predicate letter A21 is included in our alphabet. A21 will be denoted
by = and, for every t, q terms, A21(t, u) will be denoted by t = u.
A first-order system is called a first-order system with equality iff the following wffs are included in
its set of axioms:
(E1) x1 = x1. 3
(E2) ti = u → fnm(t1, ..., tn) = fnm(t1, ..., ti−1, q, ti+1, ..., tn), with fnm a function letter of L , i ∈ {1, ..., n}
and q, t1, ..., tn terms of L .
(E3) ti = u→ (Anm(t1, ..., tn)→ Anm(t1, ..., ti−1, q, ti+1, ..., tn)), with Anm a predicate letter ofL , i ∈ {1, ..., n}
and q, t1, ..., tn terms of L .
An axiom of a first-order system with equality is called:
3Notice that, for every m ∈ N+, xm = xm is a theorem of such a first-order system, since a variable can be replaced in a wff
by any other variable which does not occur in it, without altering the quality of being a theorem.
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• A logical axiom iff it is an axiom of KL .
• An axiom for equality iff it is one of the axioms (E1), (E2) or (E3).
• A proper axiom otherwise.
First-order systems with equality capture the notion of «equivalence relation», since the following wffs are
always theorems of those systems (see Proposition 5.4. of [Hamilton]):
• ∀ x1 x1 = x1.
• ∀ x1 ∀ x2 (x1 = x2 → x2 = x1).
• ∀ x1 ∀ x2 ∀ x3 (x1 = x2 → (x2 = x3 → x1 = x3)).
Therefore, given a model I of a first-order system with equality, PI(=) is an equivalence relation over
DI .
Nevertheless, in a model of a first-order system with equality the symbol = need not necessarily be
interpreted by equality. For example, if Σ = {f21 ,=} and I is interpretation such that DI = Z, FI(f21 ) is
addition and PI(=) is congruence modulo 2, I is a model of KL in which (E1), (E2) and (E3) are true.
Given a model I of a first-order system with equality:
• I is a normal model iff PI(=) is equality.
• It is possible to construct a normal model from I, called the contraction of I: a model J is the
contraction of I iff:
◦ DJ = {[x]PI(=) | x ∈ DI}.
◦ Given a constant cm of L , CJ(cm) = [cm]PI(=).
◦ Given a function letter fnm of L and d1, ..., dn ∈ DI , FJ(fnm)(d1, ..., dn) = [FI(fnm)(d1, ..., dn)]PI(=).
◦ Given a predicate letter Anm of L and d1, ..., dn ∈ DI , 〈[d1]PI(=), ..., [dn]PI(=)〉 ∈ PJ(Anm) iff
〈d1, ..., dn〉 ∈ PI(Anm).
Intuitively, J is obtained from I by reducing everything modulo the equivalence relation PI(=).
Let α(xm) a wff of L in which xm occurs free, and let xn be a variable which does not occur at all in
α(xm). Then the wff ∃ xm α(xm) ∧ ∀ xm ∀ xn (α(xm) ∧ (α(xn) → xm = xn)) is denoted by ∃! xm α(xm).
The symbol ∃! is read «there is one, and only one,».
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Chapter 2
Peano arithmetic
From now on, we will denote:
• c1 by 0.
• f11 by ′ and, for every term t, f11 (t) by t′.
• f21 by + and, for every t, u terms, f21 (t, u) by t+ u.
• f22 by · and, for every t, u terms, f22 (t, u) by t · u.
Until the end of our work, our alphabet of symbols will beΣ = {0,+, ·,′ ,=} (and, as usual, we will denote
LΣ simply by L ).
Peano arithmetic, denoted by PA, is the first-order system with equality whose proper axioms are:
(N1) ∀ x1 ¬x′1 = 0.
(N2) ∀ x1 ∀ x2 (x′1 = x′2 → x1 = x2).
(N3) ∀ x1 x1 + 0 = x1.
(N4) ∀ x1 ∀ x2 x1 + (x′2) = (x1 + x2)′.
(N5) ∀ x1 x1 · 0 = 0.
(N6) ∀ x1 ∀ x2 x1 · (x′2) = (x1 · x2) + x1.
(N7) Given a wff α(x1) of PA in which x1 occurs free, (α(0) ∧ ∀ x1 (α(x1) → α(x′1))) → ∀ x1 α(x1), with
α(0) and α(x′1) the wffs obtained by replacing in α(x1) all the free occurrences of x1 by 0 and x′1
respectively.
Axioms (N1), (N2) and (N7) are based on the classical Peano’s axioms, (N7) being a version of the
Principle of Induction. (N3) and (N4) provide a recursive definition of addition, and (N5) and (N6) a
recursive definition of multiplication.
However, (N7) is in fact weaker than the usual Principle of Induction, since the latter refers to the set of
all subsets of N, which is uncountable, whereas the former refers to the set of those subsets of N definable by
an arithmetical formula, which is countable.
The interpretation I of PA such that DI = N, CI(0) = 0, FI(+) is addition, FI(·) is multiplication, FI(′)
is the successor function and PI(A21) is equality is called the standard interpretation of PA, and, from
now on:
• As usual, we will consider that multiplication prevails over the addition, so for example the wff (x1 ·
x2) + x3 will be simply written as x1 · x2 + x3.
• Terms 0, 0′, 0′′, ..., 0′...(n strokes)...′, ... are called numerals and denoted by 0, 1, 2, ..., n, ... respectively
(except the term 0 which will usually be denoted by 0). Notice that every numeral is free for every
variable in every wff.
• Given terms t and s, we will denote the wff ∃ x1 x′1 + t = s by t < s.
• Given a wff α of PA, we will write `PA α iff α is a theorem of PA.
If we accept the standard interpretation of PA as a model of PA, then PA is consistent. This model is
known as the standard model of arithmetic.
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PA is strong enough to prove almost every theorem of elementary number theory. For example, Euclidean
division (see Proposition 3.11 of [Mendelson]):
`PA ∀ x1 ∀ x2 (¬x2 = 0→ ∃! x3 ∃! x4 (x1 = x2 · x3 + x4 ∧ x4 < x2)).
However, is it possible to obtain all «arithmetical truths» as formal theorems, i.e. is PA complete?
Unfortunately, this is not the case, since the fact that PA is incomplete is precisely the content of Gödel’s
Incompleteness Theorem.
If I is the standard model of PA, then the extension V of PA obtained by adding as axioms all wffs which
are true in I is consistent and complete.
Proof
• V is consistent, since I is clearly a model of V .
• V is complete:
◦ Given a sentence α, α or ¬α are true in I, since every sentence is true or false.
◦ Then, α or ¬α are theorems of V .
◦ So V is complete.

However, V is useless. The reason for this will be made clear in the last chapter.
Every model for PA has an infinite domain, and given a cardinal number ℵβ , PA has a normal model with
domain of cardinality ℵβ (see proposition 3.6 of [Mendelson]).
The incompleteness of PA is related to another important deficiency of the system.
Does PA characterize N (up to isomorphism), i.e. is the standard model the «only» (normal) model
of PA?
Once again, the answer is negative, because there are «essentially different» normal models of PA:
• Let α be a sentence of PA such that neither α nor ¬α are theorems of PA (such α exists by Gödel’s
Incompleteness Theorem).
• Let PAα and PA¬α be the extensions of PA obtained by adding as axioms α and ¬α respectively.
• PAα and PA¬α are consistent (see Proposition 4.35 of [Hamilton]).
• Let Iα and I¬α be denumerable models of PAα and PA¬α respectively. Such models exists since:
◦ A first-order system has a model iff it is consistent.
◦ Given a cardinal number ℵβ , PA has a normal model with domain of cardinality ℵβ .
• Let I˜α and I˜¬α be the contractions of Iα and I¬α respectively.
• I˜α and I˜¬α are two normal models of PA, with denumerable domain, since every model for PA has an
infinite domain.
To finish this section, we introduce an interesting notion which will be needed later: PA is ω-consistent,
i.e. there is no wff α of PA such that:
• α contains (at least) one free occurrence of x1.
• Given n ∈ N, `PA ¬αx1n .
• `PA ∃ x1 α.
Proof
• Let I be the standard model for PA.
• Assume that there is a wff α of PA such that:
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◦ α contains (at least) one free occurrence of x1.
◦ Given n ∈ N, `PA ¬αx1n .
◦ `PA ∃ x1 α.
• Thus, for every n ∈ N, ¬αx1n is true in I.
• Hence, ∀ x1 ¬α is true in I.
• But ∃ x1 α, i.e. ¬∀ x1 ¬α is also true in I. Impossible, since a wff is false iff its negation is true.
• So PA is ω-consistent.

Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem
Chapter 3
Recursiveness
The main purpose of this chapter is to answer a more technical question.
What relations over the natural numbers are such that, when they hold, there is a theorem of PA that
gives account of this fact?
Certain relations, called recursive relations, are characterized (as we will see in the last section of this
chapter) by satisfying this sort of property.
3.1 Definitions and examples
A number-theoretic relation of k arguments is a subset of Nk, and a number-theoretic function
of k arguments is an operation from Nk to N.
A recursive function is a number-theoretic function inductively defined by the following rules:
1. The zero function, Z(n) := 0, is recursive.
2. The successor function, S(n) := n+ 1, is recursive.
3. Given i ∈ {1, ..., k}, the ith projection function of k arguments, Pki (n1, ..., nk) := ni, is recursive.
4. (Substitution Rule) Given recursive functions g(n1, ..., ni), h1(n1, ..., nk), ..., hi(n1, ..., nk),
g(h1(n1, ..., nk), ..., hi(n1, ..., nk)) is recursive.
5. (Recursion Rule) Given recursive functions g(n1, ..., nk) and h(n1, ..., nk+2), is also recursive the
function f : Nk+1 −→ N.
〈n1, ..., nk, 0〉 7−→ g(n1, ..., nk)
〈n1, ..., nk, n+ 1〉 7−→ h(n1, ..., nk, n, f(n1, ..., nk, n))
Here, we allow n = 0, in which case we have that the function f : N −→ N is recursive.
0 7−→ g(0)
n+ 1 7−→ h(n, f(n))
6. Given a recursive function g(n1, ..., nk+1) such that, for every n1, ..., nk ∈ N, there is an m ∈ N such
that g(n1, ..., nk,m) = 0, the µ-operator µg(n1, ..., nk) := min({m ∈ N | g(n1, ..., nk,m) = 0}), is
recursive.
7. The set of recursive functions is generated by rules 1 to 6.
Notice that, given a recursive function g(n1, ..., nk), g(Prj1(n1, ..., nr), ...,Prjk(n1, ..., nr)) is recursive, by
the Substitution Rule. This gives certain freedom to define new number-theoretic functions, for example:
• (Adding dummy variables) Given a recursive function g(m,n), f(m,n, p) := g(m, p) is recursive.
• (Permuting variables) Given a recursive function g(m,n, p), f(m,n, p) := g(p,m, n) is recursive.
• (Identifying variables) Given a recursive function g(m,n, p), f(m,n) := g(n,m,m) is recursive.
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Now we give a list of recursive functions, that will be needed in the sequel:
1. m+ n
2. m · n
3. m−˙n :=
{
m− n if m > n
0 if m < n
}
4. |m− n| :=
{
m− n if m > n
n−m if m < n
}
5. sg(n) :=
{
1 if n > 0
0 if n = 0
}
6. sg(n) :=
{
0 if n > 0
1 if n = 0
}
7. n!
8. min{n1, ..., nk}
9. max{n1, ..., nk}
10. qt(m,n) := max{q ∈ N | n− q ·m > 0}
11. rm(m,n) := n− qt(m,n) ·m
12. τ(n) :=
{
1 if n = 0
#{m ∈ N+ | m|n} otherwise
}
Proof
(We only prove some of them, in order to give an idea, for the rest of the proof see Proposition 3.15 of
[Mendelson]).
1. + : N2 −→ N
〈m, 0〉 7−→ P11 (m)
〈m,n+ 1〉 7−→ S(P33 (m,n,m+ n))
2. · : N2 −→ N
〈m, 0〉 7−→ Z(m)
〈m,n+ 1〉 7−→ P33 (m,n,m · n) + P31 (m,n,m · n)
7. Let f(n) := n!
f : N −→ N
0 7−→ 1
n+ 1 7−→ (n+ 1) · f(n)
12. τ(n) =
∑
m<n+1
(sg(rm(m,n)))

The so-called bounded sums and bounded products are also recursive:
1. If k > 1, for every recursive function f(n1, ..., nk) and p ∈ N:
(a)
∑
m<p
(f(n1, ..., nk−1,m)) :=
{
0 if p = 0
f(n1, ..., nk−1, 0) + ...+ f(n1, ..., nk−1, p− 1) if p > 0
}
(b)
∏
m<p
(f(n1, ..., nk−1,m)) :=
{
0 if p = 0
f(n1, ..., nk−1, 0) · ... · f(n1, ..., nk−1, p− 1) if p > 0
}
2. Given a recursive function f(n) and p ∈ N:
(a)
∑
m<p
(f(m)) :=
{
0 if p = 0
f(0) + ...+ f(p− 1) if p > 0
}
(b)
∏
m<p
(f(m)) :=
{
0 if p = 0
f(0) · ... · f(p− 1) if p > 0
}
Proof
(We only prove one of them, in order to give an idea, for the rest of the proof see Proposition 3.16 of
[Mendelson]).
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Let g(n1, ..., nk−1, p) :=
∑
m<p
(f(n1, ..., nk−1,m)).
g : Nk −→ N
〈n1, ..., nk−1, 0〉 7−→ 0
〈n1, ..., nk−1, p+ 1〉 7−→ g(n1, ..., nk−1, p) + f(n1, ..., nk−1, p)

The characteristic function of a number-theoretic relation A(n1, ..., nk) is defined by
CA(n1, ..., nk) :=
{
1 if 〈n1, ..., nk〉 /∈ A
0 if 〈n1, ..., nk〉 ∈ A
}
, and we define A to be a recursive relation iff CA is a
recursive function.
For example:
• = is recursive, since C=(m,n) = sg(|m− n|)
• < is recursive, since C<(m,n) = sg(|n−˙m|)
• | is recursive, since C|(m,n) = sg(rm(m,n))
• Pr := {m ∈ N | m is prime} is recursive, since CPr(n) = sg(τ(n)−˙2) + sg(|n− 1|) + sg(|n− 0|)
Remember that n is prime iff it has exactly two divisors and is not equal to 0 or 1.
Given a recursive relation A(n1, ..., nk) (see Proposition 3.17 of [Mendelson]):
• For every recursive relation B(n1, ..., nk), A ∪ B, A ∩ B, Nk\A are recursive, so from now on, we
denote:
◦ 〈n1, ..., nk〉 ∈ A ∩B by A(n1, ..., nk) ∧B(n1, ..., nk).
◦ 〈n1, ..., nk〉 ∈ A ∪B by A(n1, ..., nk) ∨B(n1, ..., nk).
◦ 〈n1, ..., nk〉 ∈ Nk\A by ¬A(n1, ..., nk).
• If k > 1:
◦ {〈n1, ..., nk−1,m〉 ∈ Nk | for every p ∈ N such that p < m, 〈n1, ..., nk−1, p〉 ∈ A} is recursive,
so from now on, we denote that for every p ∈ N such that p < m, 〈n1, ..., nk−1, p〉 ∈ A by
∀ pp<m A(n1, ..., nk−1, p).
◦ {〈n1, ..., nk−1,m〉 ∈ Nk | there is p ∈ N such that, if p < m 〈n1, ..., nk−1, p〉 ∈ A} is recursive,
so from now on, we denote that there is p ∈ N such that, if p < m 〈n1, ..., nk−1, p〉 ∈ A by
∃ pp<m A(n1, ..., nk−1, p).
• {m ∈ N | for every p ∈ N such that p < m, p ∈ A} is recursive, so from now on, we denote that
for every p ∈ N such that p < m, p ∈ A by ∀ pp<m A(p).
• {m ∈ Nk | there is p ∈ N such that, if p < m, p ∈ A} is recursive, so from now on, we denote that
there is p ∈ N such that, if p < m p ∈ A by ∃ pp<m A(p).
The so-called bounded µ-operators are also recursive: given a number-theoretic relation A(n1, ..., nk)
and p ∈ N, we denote:
• If k > 1, µ mm<p A(n1, ..., nk−1,m) := min({m ∈ N | 〈n1, ..., nk−1,m〉 ∈ A}) if there is m ∈ N such that〈n1, ..., nk,m〉 ∈ A and m < p
p otherwise
. 1
• If k = 1, µ mm<p A(m) :=
 min(A) if there is m ∈ Asuch that m < p
p otherwise
.
1
Proof
1The value p is chosen in the second cases because it is more convenient in later proofs, but this choice has no intuitive
significance.
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• µ mm<p A(n1, ..., nk−1,m) =
∑
m<p
( ∏
q<m+1
(CA(n1, ..., nk−1, q))
)
.
• µ mm<p A(m) =
∑
m<p
( ∏
q<m+1
(CA(q))
)
.

Every finite subset of N is recursive (see Proposition 6.24 and example 6.25.a of [Hamilton]).
Then, we continue listing useful recursive functions:
1. p(n), the n-th prime number.
2. l(n) :=
 0 if n = 01 if n = 1max({m ∈ N | p(m)|n}) if n > 2
.
3. Given i ∈ {0, ..., l(n)}, (n)i :=
 0 if n = 00 if n = 1max({m ∈ N | p(i)m|n}) if n > 2
.
4. m ∗ n := m · ∏
i<l(n)+1
(
p(l(m) + i+ 1)(n)i
)
.
Notice that, for every m,n, p ∈ N+, m ∗ (n ∗ p) = (m ∗ n) ∗ p, so there is no harm in this case in
omitting parentheses when writing two of more applications of ∗.
Proof
1. p : N −→ N.
0 7−→ 2
n+ 1 7−→ µ mm<p(n)!+2 (p(n) < m ∧ Pr(m))2
2. l(n) = n−˙µ mm<n+1 (p(n−˙m)|n).
3. (n)i = µ mm<n (p(i)m|n ∧ p(i)m+1 - n).
4. Immediate.

3.2 Course-of-values recursion
It is often convenient to define functions by a recursion in which the value of f(n1, ..., nk−1, p+1) depends
not only upon f(n1, ..., nk−1, p) but also upon several or all values of f(n1, ..., nk−1,m), with m 6 p. This
type of recursion is called a course-of-values recursion.
Let f(n1, ..., nk) be a number-theoretic function, and f#(n1, ..., nk−1, p) :=
∏
m<p
(
p(m)f(n1,...,nk−1,m)
)
.
Notice that f(n1, ..., nk−1, p) = (f#(n1, ..., nk−1, p+ 1))p.
Then (see Proposition 3.19 and corollary 3.20 of [Mendelson]):
• For every recursive function h(n1, ..., nk+1) and a number-theoretic function f(n1, ..., nk) such that
f(n1, ..., nk−1, p) = h(n1, ..., nk−1, p, f#(n1, ..., nk−1, p)), f is recursive.
• For every number-theoretic relation A(n1, ..., nk) and recursive function h(n1, ..., nk+1) such that, for
every n1, ..., nk−1, p ∈ N, 〈n1, ..., nk, p〉 ∈ A iff h(n1, ..., nk−1, p, CA#(n1, ..., nk−1, p)), A is recursive.
For example, let f be the Fibonacci sequence.
Then, f : N −→ N, i.e. f : N −→ N.
0 7−→ 1 n 7−→ sg(n) + sg(|n− 1|) + sg(n−˙1) · ((f#(n))n−˙1 + (f#(n))n−˙2)
2The bound is obtained from Euclid’s proof of the infinitude of primes.
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1 7−→ 1
n+ 2 7−→ f(n) + f(n+ 1)
Notice that, considering h : N2 −→ N, f(n) = h(n, f#(n)), so f is recursive.
〈m,n〉 7−→ sg(m) + sg(|m− 1|) + sg(m−˙1) · ((n)m−˙1 + (n)m−˙2)
3.3 Expressibility and representability
A number-theoretic relation A of k arguments is expressible in PA iff there is a wff α(x1, ..., xk) of PA
with precisely k free variables such that, for any n1, ..., nk ∈ N, if α(n1, ..., nk) is the wff obtained by replacing
in α(x1, ..., xk), for every i ∈ {1, ..., k}, all the free occurrences of xi by ni:
• If 〈n1, ..., nk〉 ∈ A, `PA α(n1, ..., nk).
• If 〈n1, ..., nk〉 /∈ A, `PA ¬α(n1, ..., nk).
A number-theoretic function f of k arguments is representable in PA iff there is a wff α(x1, ..., xk+1) of
PA with precisely k + 1 free variables such that, for any n1, ..., nk+1 ∈ N:
• If 〈n1, ..., nk+1〉 ∈ A, `PA α(n1, ..., nk+1).
• `PA ∃! xk+1 α(n1, ..., nk, xk+1).
Every recursive function is representable in PA. 3
3
Proof
• First, we need the following lemmas:
◦ Lemma I (Gödel’s β-function) β(m,n, p) := rm(1 + (p+ 1) ·n,m) is representable in PA by the
wff Bt(x1, ..., x4) defined as ∃ w (x1 = (1 + (x3 + 1) · x2) · w + x4 ∧ x4 < 1 + (x3 + 1) · x2).
Proof
∗ Let m,n, p, q ∈ N such that β(m,n, p) = q.
∗ Then, there is r ∈ N such that:
· m = (1 + (p+ 1) · n) · r + q.
· q < 1 + (p+ 1) · n.
∗ Hence, `PA (m = (1 + (p+ 1) · n) · r + q) ∧ q < 1 + (p+ 1) · n).
∗ Applying Rule E4, `PA Bt(m,n, p, q).
∗ Finally, notice that `PA ∃! x4 Bt(m,n, p, x4), by the «translation» to PA of Euclidean division
given in Chapter 2.

◦ Lemma II For any sequence of natural numbers n0, ..., nk, there are b, c ∈ N such that, for every
i ∈ {0, ..., k},
β(b, c, i) = ni.
Proof
∗ Let j := max{k, n0, ..., nk} and c := j!.
∗ Consider, for every i ∈ {0, ..., k}, ui := 1 + (i+ 1) · c.
∗ Given h, i ∈ {0, ..., k} such that h 6= i, uh and ui are relatively prime:
· Assume h < i, and suppose there is a prime number p such that p | uh and p | ui.
· Then, p | ui − uh, i.e. p | (i− h) · c, hence, p | i− h or p | c.
· But if p | c, then p | uh and p | (h+ 1) · c, i.e. p | 1 + (h+ 1) · c and p | (h+ 1) · c, hence
p | 1, a contradiction.
· And notice that, if p | i− h, then p | c, since i− h 6 h 6 j, and so i− h | j! = c.
∗ Also, for every i ∈ {0, ..., k}, ni 6 j 6 j! = c < 1 + (i+ 1) · c = ui.
∗ Finally, by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, there is b ∈ N such that b < u0 · ... · uk and, for
every i ∈ {0, ..., k}, rm(ui, b) = ni, i.e. β(b, c, i) = rm(1 + (i+ 1) · c, b) = ni.

3The converse is also true, see Proposition 3.28 of [Mendelson].
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◦ Lemma III For any wff α of PA and n ∈ N+, `PA (α(0)∧ ...∧α(n− 1))→ ∀ x1 (x1 < n→ α(x1))
(see Proposition 3.8 of [Mendelson]).
• Z is representable in PA by x1 = x1 ∧ x2 = 0:
◦ Z(n) = m ⇒ 0 = m ⇒ `PA n = n ∧m = 0.
◦ Given n ∈ N, `PA ∃! x2 n = n ∧ x2 = 0.
• S is representable in PA by x2 = x′1:
◦ S(n) = m ⇒ n+ 1 = m ⇒ `PA m = n′.
◦ Given n ∈ N, `PA ∃! x2 x2 = n′.
• Pki is representable in PA by x1 = x1 ∧ ... ∧ xk = xk ∧ xk+1 = xi:
◦ Pki (n1, ..., nk) = m ⇒ ni = m ⇒ `PA n1 = n1 ∧ ... ∧ nk = nk ∧m = ni.
◦ Given n1, ..., nk ∈ N, `PA ∃! xk+1 n1 = n1 ∧ ... ∧ nk = nk ∧ xi+1 = ni.
• The Substitution Rule does not lead out of the set of the representable functions.
Let g(n1, ..., ni) be representable in PA by a wff β(x1, ..., xi+1), and h1(n1, ..., nk), ..., hi(n1, ..., nk) be
representable in PA by wffs α1(x1, ..., xk+1), ..., αi(x1, ..., xk+1), respectively,
and let f(n1, ..., nk) := g(h1(n1, ..., nk), ..., hi(n1, ..., nk)).
Then f is representable in PA by the wff γ(x1, ..., xk+1) defined as
∃ y1 ... ∃ yi (α1(x1, ..., xk, y1) ∧ ... ∧ αi(x1, ..., xk, yi) ∧ β(y1, ..., yi, xk+1)).
Indeed (let n1, ..., nk,m ∈ N such that f(n1, ..., nk) = m):
◦ f(n1, ..., nk) = m rj :=hj(n1,...,nk)⇒ g(r1, ..., ri) = m
g, h1, ..., hi are representable in PA
by β, α1, ..., αi⇒{ `PA β(r1, ..., ri,m)
`PA αj(n1, ..., nk, rj)
} Conjunction
Introduction⇒
`PA α1(n1, ..., nk, r1) ∧ ... ∧ αi(n1, ..., nk, ri) ∧ β(r1, ..., ri,m) Rule E4⇒
`PA ∃ y1 ...∃ yi (n1, ..., nk, y1) ∧ ... ∧ αi(n1, ..., nk, yi) ∧ β(y1, ..., yi,m)) ⇒ `PA γ(n1, ..., nk,m).
◦
{ `PA γ(n1, ..., nk, xk+1)
`PA γ(n1, ..., nk, xk+2)
}
⇒{ `PA ∃ y1 ... ∃ yi (α1(n1, ..., nk, y1) ∧ ... ∧ αi(n1, ..., nk, yi) ∧ β(y1, ..., yi, xk+1))
`PA ∃ y1 ... ∃ yi (α1(n1, ..., nk, y1) ∧ ... ∧ αi(n1, ..., nk, yi) ∧ β(y1, ..., yi, xk+2))
}
Rule C⇒
For certain new constants b1, ..., bi, c1, ..., ci,{ `PA α1(n1, ..., nk, b1) ∧ ... ∧ αi(n1, ..., nk, bi) ∧ β(b1, ..., bi, xk+1)
`PA α1(n1, ..., nk, c1) ∧ ... ∧ αi(n1, ..., nk, ci) ∧ β(c1, ..., ci, xk+2)
} Conjunction
Elimination⇒
`PA αj(n1, ..., nk, bj)
`PA β(b1, ..., bi, xk+1)
`PA αj(n1, ..., nk, cj)
`PA β(c1, ..., ci, xk+2)

`PA ∃! xk+1 αj(n1, ..., nk, xk+1)
(since hj is representable in PA by αj)⇒
bj = cj = rj

`PA β(b1, ..., bi, xi+1)
Axioms for equality
`PA ∃! xi+1 β(x1, ..., xi+1)
(since g is representable in PA by β)

⇒ xk+1 = xk+2
`PA ∃ xk+1 γ(n1, ..., nk, xk+1)⇒
`PA ∃! xk+1 γ(n1, ..., nk, xk+1).
• The Recursion Rule does not lead out of the set of representable functions.
Let g(n1, ..., nk) and h(n1, ..., nk,m, p) be representable in PA by wffs α(x1, ..., xk+1) and β(x1, ..., xk+3),
respectively, and let f : Nk+1 −→ N.
〈n1, ..., nk, 0〉 7−→ g(n1, ..., nk)
〈n1, ..., nk,m+ 1〉 7−→ h(n1, ..., nk,m, f(n1, ..., nk,m))
We shall show that f is representable in PA by the following wff γ(x1, ..., xk+2):
∃ u ∃ v (∃ w (Bt(u, v, 0, w) ∧ α(x1, ..., xk, w)) ∧ Bt(u, v, xk+1, xk+2) ∧
∀ w (w < xk+1 → ∃ y ∃ z (Bt(u, v, w, y) ∧ Bt(u, v, w′, z) ∧ β(x1, ..., xk, w, y, z)))).
Indeed (let n1, ..., nk, p,m ∈ N such that f(n1, ..., nk, p) = m):
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◦ `PA γ(n1, ..., nk, p,m):
∗ Case p = 0
· Lemma II ⇒ There are b, c ∈ N such that β(b, c, 0) = m Lemma I⇒ `PA Bt(b, c, 0,m). [0]
· p = 0 ⇒ m = f(n1, ..., nk, 0) = g(n1, ..., nk) g is representable in PA by α⇒
`PA α(n1, ..., nk,m)
[0], Rule E4,
Conjunction
Introduction⇒ `PA ∃ w (Bt(b, c, 0, w) ∧ α(n1, ..., nk, w)). [1]
· `PA ¬w < 0 Gen for w⇒
∀ w (w < 0→ ∃ y ∃ z (Bt(b, c, w, y)∧Bt(b, c, w′, z)∧β(n1, ..., nk, w, y, z)))
[0], [1], Rule E4,
Conjunction
Introduction⇒
`PA ∃ u ∃ v (∃ w (Bt(u, v, 0, w) ∧ α(n1, ..., nk, w)) ∧ Bt(u, v, 0,m) ∧
∀ w (w < 0→ ∃ y ∃ z (Bt(u, v, w, y) ∧ Bt(u, v, w′, z) ∧ β(n1, ..., nk, w, y, z)))) ⇒
`PA γ(n1, ..., nk, 0,m).
∗ Case p > 0
· Given i ∈ {0, ..., p}, let ri := f(n1, ..., nk, i).
· Lemma II ⇒ there are b, c ∈ N such that for every i ∈ {0, ..., p} β(b, c, i) = ri. [0]
· Lemma I [0]⇒ for every i ∈ {0, ..., p} `PA Bt(b, c, i, ri). [1]
· [1] ⇒ for every i ∈ {0, ..., p− 1} `PA Bt(b, c, i+ 1, ri+1). [2]
· Given i ∈ {0, ..., p− 1}, ri+1 = f(n1, ..., nk, i+ 1) =
h(n1, ..., nk, i, f(n1, ..., nk, i)) = h(n1, ..., nk, i, ri)
h is representable in PA by β⇒
for every i ∈ {0, ..., p− 1} `PA β(n1, ..., nk, i, ri, ri+1)
[1], [2], Rule E4,
Conjunction
Introduction⇒
for every i ∈ {0, ..., p− 1}
`PA ∃ y ∃ z (Bt(b, c, i, y) ∧ Bt(b, c, i+ 1, z) ∧ β(n1, ..., nk, i, y, z)) Lemma III⇒
for every i ∈ {0, ..., p− 1}
`PA ∀ w (w < p→ ∃ y ∃ z (Bt(b, c, w, y) ∧ Bt(b, c, w′, z) ∧ β(n1, ..., nk, w, y, z))). [3]
· [0] ⇒ β(b, c, p) = rp = f(n1, ..., nk, p) = m Lemma I⇒ `PA Bt(b, c, p,m). [4]
· r0 = f(n1, ..., nk, 0) = g(n1, ..., nk) g is representable in PA by α⇒ `PA α(n1, ..., nk, r0)
[1], Rule E4,
Conjunction
Introduction⇒
`PA ∃ w (Bt(b, c, 0, w) ∧ α(n1, ..., nk, w))
[3], [4], Rule E4,
Conjunction
Introduction⇒
`PA ∃ u ∃ v (∃ w Bt(u, v, 0, w) ∧ α(n1, ..., nk, w)) ∧ Bt(u, v, p,m) ∧
∀ w (w < p→ ∃ y ∃ z (Bt(u, v, w, y) ∧ Bt(u, v, w′, z) ∧ β(n1, ..., nk, w, y, z)))) ⇒
`PA γ(n1, ..., nk, p,m).
◦ We must show that `PA ∃! xk+2 γ(n1, ..., nk, p, xk+2). Notice that, by what we have proved above,
it suffices to prove only uniqueness. We will do it by induction on p.
∗ Case 0
Since γ(n1, ..., nk, 0, xk+2) is ∃ u ∃ v (∃ w (Bt(u, v, 0, w)∧α(n1, ..., nk, w))∧Bt(u, v, 0, xk+2) ∧
∀ w (w < 0 → ∃ y ∃ z (Bt(u, v, w, y) ∧ Bt(u, v, w′, z) ∧ β(n1, ..., nk, w, y, z)))), it suffices to
prove uniqueness for ∃! xk+2 ∃ u ∃ v Bt(u, v, 0, xk+2), i.e. for ∃! xk+2 ∃ u ∃ v ∃ w (u =
(1 + v) · w + xk+2 ∧ xk+2 < 1 + v), that can be easily obtained from the «translation» to PA
of Euclidean division given in Chapter 2.
∗ Case p
Induction hypothesis. [IH]
∗ Case p+ 1
· B := f(n1, ..., nk, p) f is representable in PA by γ⇒ `PA γ(n1, ..., nk, p, B). [0]
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· C := f(n1, ..., nk, p+ 1) B=f(n1,...,nk,p)= h(n1, ..., nk, p, B) h is representable in PA by β⇒
`PA β(n1, ..., nk, p, B,C). [1]
· C = f(n1, ..., nk, p+ 1) f is representable in PA by γ⇒ `PA γ(n1, ...nk, p+ 1, C).
· Assume `PA γ(n1, ..., nk, p+ 1, xk+2). We must prove xk+2 = C.
· Applying Rule C and Conjunction Elimination to `PA γ(n1, ..., nk, p+ 1, xk+2), we have
that, for certain new constants b and c:
 `PA ∃ w (Bt(b, c, 0, w) ∧ α(n1, ..., nk, w)). [2]
 `PA Bt(b, c, p+ 1, xk+2). [3]
 `PA ∀ w (w < p+ 1→ ∃ y ∃ z (Bt(b, c, w, y) ∧ Bt(b, c, w′, z) ∧ β(n1, ..., nk, w, y, z))).[4]
· [4] (K4), MP⇒ `PA ∃ y ∃ z (Bt(b, c, p, y) ∧ Bt(b, c, p+ 1, z) ∧ β(n1, ..., nk, p, y, z)) Rule C⇒
For certain new constants d and e,
`PA Bt(b, c, p, d) ∧ Bt(b, c, p+ 1, e) ∧ β(n1, ..., nk, p, d, e). [5]
· [4] ⇒
`PA ∀ w (w < p→ ∃ y ∃ z (Bt(b, c, w, y)∧Bt(b, c, w′, z)∧β(n1, ..., nk, w, y, z)))
[2], [5], Rule E4,
Conjunction
Introduction⇒
`PA ∃ u ∃ v (∃ w (Bt(u, v, 0, w) ∧ α(n1, ..., nk, w)) ∧ Bt(u, v, p, d) ∧
∀ w (w < p→ ∃ y ∃ z (Bt(u, v, w, y) ∧ Bt(u, v, w′, z) ∧ β(n1, ..., nk, w, y, z)))) ⇒
`PA γ(n1, ..., nk, p, d) [0], [IH]⇒ d = B [5]⇒
`PA Bt(b, c, p, B)∧Bt(b, c, p+ 1, e)∧β(n1, ..., nk, p, B, e) [1],h is representable in PA by β⇒ e =
C
[5]⇒
`PA Bt(b, c, p+ 1, C) [3], Lemma I⇒ xk+2 = C ⇒ `PA ∃! xk+2 γ(n1, ..., nk, p+ 1, xk+2).
• Let g(n1, ..., nk+1) be representable in PA by a wff α(x1, ..., xk+2) and such that, for every n1, ..., nk ∈ N,
there is m ∈ N such that g(n1, ..., nk,m) = 0.
Then µg is representable in PA by the wff α(x1, ..., xk+1, 0)∧∀ xk+2 (xk+2 < xk+1 → ¬α(x1, ..., xk, xk+2, 0)).
Indeed (let n1, ..., nk,m ∈ N such that µg(n1, ..., nk) = m):
◦ µg(n1, ..., nk) = m ⇒ min{k ∈ N | g(n1, ..., nk, k) = 0} = m Lemma III⇒
`PA ∀ xk+2 (xk+2 < m→ ¬α(n1, ..., nk, xk+2, 0)) g is representable in PA by α⇒
`PA α(n1, ..., nk,m, 0) ∧ ∀ xk+2 (xk+2 < m→ ¬α(n1, ..., nk, xk+2, 0)).
◦ `PA ∃! xk+1 (α(n1, ..., nk, xk+1, 0) ∧ ∀ xk+2 (xk+2 < xk+1 → ¬α(n1, ..., nk, xk+2, 0))).

Every recursive relation is expressible in PA. 4
4
Proof
• Consider a recursive relation A of k arguments, and n1, ..., nk+1 ∈ N.
• A is recursive ⇒ CA is recursive
Every recursive function
is representable⇒
CA is representable in PA by a wff α(x1, ..., xk+1), i.e.:
◦ If CA(n1, ..., nk) = nk+1,`PA α(n1, ..., nk+1). [1]
◦ `PA ∃! xk+1 α(n1, ..., nk, xk+1). [2]
• Then, A is expressible in PA by α(x1, ..., xk, 0):
◦ 〈n1, ..., nk〉 ∈ A ⇒ CA(n1, ..., nk) = 0 [1]⇒ `PA α(n1, ..., nk, 0).
◦ 〈n1, ..., nk〉 /∈ A ⇒ CA(n1, ..., nk) = 1 [1]⇒ `PA α(n1, ..., nk, 1) [2]⇒ `PA ¬α(n1, ..., nk, 0).

4The converse is also true, see Corollary 3.29 of [Mendelson].
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Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem
4.1 Gödel numbers
We now pose a clever and seemingly unnatural question.
Is it possible to «translate» propositions of logic into wffs of PA?
Yes, encoding such propositions using a function called Gödel’s arithmetization. This technique will
allow us to prove that PA is incomplete.
The function G : {(, ), , ,¬,→,∀} ∪ {xm, cm, Anm, fnm}m,n∈N+ −→ N is called Gödel’s arithmetization.
(, ), , 7−→ 3, 5, 7
¬,→,∀ 7−→ 9, 11, 13
xm, cm 7−→ 7 + 8 ·m, 9 + 8 ·m
fnm, A
n
m 7−→ 11 + 8 · 2n · 3m, 13 + 8 · 2n · 3m
And G(s) is called the Gödel number of s.
Notice that G is injective.
G can be extended in the following way, remaining injective:
• Given a string os symbols, we define G(s1 · · · sr) := p(0)G(a0) · ... · p(r)G(ar).
• Given a sequence of strings of symbols α0, ..., αr, we define G(α1 · · ·αr) := p(0)G(α0) · ... · p(r)G(αr).
For example, G(x1 = x3 → A11(x3 · x2)) = G(A21(x1, x3)→ A11(f22 (x3, x2))) =
p(0)G(() ·p(1)G(A21) ·p(2)G(() ·p(3)G(x1) ·p(4)G(,) ·p(5)G(x3) ·p(6)G()) ·p(7)G(→) ·p(8)G(A11) ·p(9)G(() ·p(10)G(f22 ) ·
p(11)G(() · p(12)G(x3) · p(13)G(,) · p(14)G(x2) · p(15)G()) · p(16)G()) · p(17)G()) =
23 · 313+8·22·31 · 53 · 77+8·1 · 117 · 137+8·3 · 175 · 1911 · 2313+8·21·31 · 293 · 3111+8·22·32 · 373 · 417+8·3 · 437 · 477+8·2 ·
535 · 595 · 615.
This method of associating numbers with symbols, strings of symbols and sequences of strings of symbols
was devised by Gödel in order to arithmetize metamatemathics, i.e. to replace assertions about a formal
system by equivalent number-theoretic statements, and then to express these statements within the formal
system itself.
The following number-theoretic functions and relations (which are understood to be about PA, although
many of them are stated in a more general way) are recursive:
1. IC(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of a constant.
2. FL(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of a function letter.
3. PL(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of a predicate letter.
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4. EVbl(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of a string consisting of a variable.
5. EIC(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of a string consisting of a constant.
6. EFL(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of a string consisting of a function letter.
7. EPL(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of a string consisting of a predicate letter.
8. ArgT(n) := (qt(8, n−˙11))0 (notice that ArgT(G(fnm)) = n).
9. ArgP(n) := (qt(8, n−˙13))0 (notice that ArgP(G(Anm)) = n).
10. Gd(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of a string of symbols of
{(, ), , ,¬,→,∀} ∪ {xm, cm, Apm, fpm}m,p∈N+ .
11. MP(m,n, p), that holds iff there are strings α and β such that m = G(α), n = G(α → β) and
p = G(β).
12. Gen(m,n), that holds iff there is a string α such that there is i ∈ N+ such that m = G(α) and
n = G(∀ xi α).
13. Trm(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of a term.
14. Atmfl(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of an atomic formula.
15. Fml(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of a wff.
16. Subst(m,n, p, q), that holds iff m is the Gödel number of αxrt , with α a wff with Gödel number n,
xr a variable with Gödel number q and t a term with Gödel number p.
17. Sub(n, p, q), the Gödel number of αxrt , with α a wff with Gödel number n, xr a variable with Gödel
number q and t a term with Gödel number p.
18. FrI(m,n), that holds iff m is the Gödel number of a term that contains (at least) one occurrence of
the variable with Gödel number n.
19. FrII(m,n), that holds iff m is the Gödel number of a wff that contains (at least) one free occurrence
of the variable with Gödel number n.
20. Ff(m,n, p), that holds iff m is the Gödel number of a term free for the variable with Gödel number
n in the wff with Gödel number p.
21. Given i ∈ {1, ..., 5}, Axi(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of an instance of axiom schema
(Ki).
22. LAx(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of a logical axiom.
23. EAx(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of an axiom for equality.
24. PrAx(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of a proper axiom of PA.
25. Ax(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of an axiom of PA.
26. Neg(n) := 29 ∗ n (notice that Neg(G(α)) = G(¬α)).
27. Cond(m,n) := 23 ∗m ∗ 211 ∗ n ∗ 25 (notice that Cond(G(α),G(β)) = G((α→ β))).
28. Clos(n), the Gödel number of the closure of the wff with Gödel number n.
29. Num(n), the Gödel number of the numeral n.
30. Nu(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of a numeral.
31. (Diagonal function) D(n), the Gödel number of αx1n , with α a wff with Gödel number n.
32. Prf(n), that holds iff n is the Gödel number of a proof in PA.
33. Pf(m,n), that holds iff m is the Gödel number of a proof in PA of the wff with Gödel number n.
Proof
(We only prove some of them, in order to give an idea, see Propositions 3.25, 3.26 and 3.27 of [Mendelson]).
1. IC(n) is ∃ mm<n (1 6 m ∧ n = G(cm)).
2. FL(n) is ∃ pp<n (1 6 p ∧ ∃ mm<n (1 6 m ∧ n = G(fpm))).
3. PL(n) is ∃ pp<n (1 6 p ∧ ∃ mm<n (1 6 m ∧ n = G(Apm))).
4. EVbl(n) is ∃ mm<n (1 6 m ∧ n = 2G(xm)).
5. EIC(n) is ∃ mm<n (IC(m) ∧ n = 2m).
6. EFL(n) is ∃ mm<n (FL(m) ∧ n = 2m).
7. EPL(n) is ∃ mm<n (PL(m) ∧ n = 2m).
10. Gd(n) is 2G(() ∨ 2G()) ∨ 2G(,) ∨ 2G(¬) ∨ 2G(→) ∨ 2G(∀) ∨ EVbl(n) ∨ EIC(n) ∨ EFL(n) ∨ EPL(n)∨
∃ mm<n ∃ pp<n (Gd(m)∧Gd(p)∧m ∗ p = n). Notice that here we are using course-of-values recursion.
16. Subst(m,n, p, q) is Fml(n) ∧ Trm(p) ∧ EVbl(2q) ∧ (
(n = 2q ∧m = p)∨
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∃ ww<n (n = 2w ∧ n 6= 2q ∧m = n)∨
∃ zz<n ∃ ww<n (
Fml(w)∧
n = 2G(∀) ∗ 2q ∗ w ∗ z∧
∃ aa<m (m = 2G(∀) ∗ 2q ∗ w ∗ a ∧ Subst(a, z, p, q)))∨
(¬∃ zz<n ∃ ww<n (Fml(w) ∧ n = 2G(∀) ∗ 2q ∗ w ∗ z)∧
∃ aa<m ∃ bb<m ∃ zz<n (
1 < z∧
n = 2(n)0 ∗ z∧
x = a ∗ b∧
Subst(a, 2(n)0 , p, q)∧
Subst(b, z, p, q)))).
Notice that we are using course-of-values recursion again.
17. Sub(n, p, q) is µ mm<(p(n·p)!)n·p Subst(m,n, p, q).
19. FrII(m,n) = Fml(m) ∧ EVbl(2n) ∧ ¬Subst(m,m, 2G(xn), n) (that is, substitution in the wff with Gödel
number m of a variable different from the variable with Gödel number n yields a different wff).
21. (Case of Ax4). Ax4(n) = ∃ mm<n ∃ pp<n ∃ qq<n (Fml(m) ∧ Trm(p) ∧ EVbl(2q) ∧ Ff(p, q,m)∧
n = 2G(() ∗ 2G(∀) ∗ 2G(() ∗ 2q ∗m ∗ 2G()) ∗ 2G(→) ∗ Sub(m, p, q) ∗ 2G(()).
23. LAx(n) = Ax1(n) ∨ ... ∨Ax5(n).
30. Nu(n) = ∃ mm<n n = Num(m).
31. D(n) = Sub(n,Num(n),G(x1)).
32. Prf(n) is ∃ mm<n ∃ pp<n ∃ qq<n ∃ rr<n (
(n = 2r ∧Ax(r))∨
(Prf(m) ∧ Fml((m)r) ∧ n = m ∗ 2p ∧Gen((m)r, p))∨
(Prf(m) ∧ Fml((m)q) ∧ Fml((m)r) ∧ n = m ∗ 2p ∧MP((m)q, (m)r, p))∨
(Prf(m) ∧ n = m ∗ 2p ∧Ax(p))).
33. Pf(m,n) is Prf(m) ∧ n = (m)l(m).

4.2 Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem
The following result is known as the Fixed Point Theorem: given a wff α of PA which contains (at
least) one free occurrence of x1, and in which x1 is the only free variable, there is a sentence S such that
`PA α(s)↔ S, where s = G(S).
Proof
• D is recursive, so D is representable in PA by a wff D(x1, x2).
• Let m be the Gödel number of the wff ∀ x2 (D(x1, x2)→ α(x2)), S the wff ∀ x2 (D(m,x2)→ α(x2)),
and s the Gödel number of S.
• It is clear that D(m) = s.
• Hence, `PA D(m, s), since D(x1, x2) represents D.
• α(x2) is deducible in PA from {α(s), D(m,x2)}:
(1) α(s) Hypothesis
(2) D(m,x2) Hypothesis
(3) ∃! x2 D(m,x2) D(x1, x2) represents D
(4) x2 = s (3), D(m, s),Basic properties of =
(5) α(x2) (1), (4),Basic properties of =
• Applying Gen and Deduction Theorem, ∀ x2 D(m,x2)→ α(x2) is deducible in PA from {α(s)}
• Applying the Deduction Theorem, `PA α(s)→ (∀ x2 D(m,x2)→ α(x2)), i.e. `PA α(s)→ S.
• α(s) is deducible in PA from {S}:
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(1) S (i.e.,∀ x2 (D(m,x2)→ α(x2))) Hypothesis
(2) ∀ x2 (D(m,x2)→ α(x2))→ (D(m, s)→ α(s)) (K4)
(3) D(m, s)→ α(s) MP(1, 2)
(4) α(s) MP(D(m, s), 3)
• Applying the Deduction Theorem, `PA S → α(s).
• Therefore, applying Biconditional Introduction Rule, `PA α(s)↔ S.

Now we can finally prove Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem: PA is incomplete.
Proof 1
• Pf is recursive, so Pf is expressible in PA by a wff Pf(x1, x2).
• Consider the wff ∀ x2 ¬Pf(x2, x1).
• By the Fixed Point Theorem, there is a sentence G, the Gödel sentence, with Gödel number q, and
such that `PA G↔ ∀ x2 ¬Pf(x2, q).
• 0PA G:
◦ Assume that `PA G and let r be the Gödel number of a proof in PA of G.
◦ `PA G ⇒ Pf(r, q) holds Pf expresses Pf⇒ `PA Pf(r, q). [1]
◦
 `PA G↔ ∀ x2 ¬Pf(x2, q)`PA GBiconditional Elimination
 ⇒ `PA ∀ x2 ¬Pf(x2, q) (K4), MP⇒ `PA ¬Pf(r, q) [1]⇒
PA is inconsistent, a contradiction.
• 0PA ¬G:
◦ Assume that `PA ¬G. Since we are assuming that PA is consistent, 0PA G.
◦
 `PA G↔ ∀ x2 ¬Pf(x2, q)`PA ¬GBiconditional Elimination
 ⇒ `PA ¬∀ x2 ¬Pf(x2, q) ⇒ `PA ∃ x2 Pf(x2, q).
◦ 0PA G ⇒ There is no proof in PA of G ⇒ Given n ∈ N, 〈n, q〉 /∈ Pf ⇒
Given n ∈ N,`PA ¬Pf(n, q) PA is ω−consistent⇒ 0PA ∃ x2 Pf(x2, q), a contradiction.
PA is inconsistent. Contradiction.
• Therefore, PA is incomplete.

Notice that, in terms of the standard interpretation, ∀ x2 ¬Pf(x2, q) says that there is no natural number
that is the Gödel number of a proof in PA of the wff G, i.e. that G is unprovable in PA. In other words, G
says «I am not provable in PA». This is an analogue of the Liar Paradox: «I am lying» (i.e. «I am not
true»). However, although the Liar Paradox leads to a contradiction, Gödel showed that G is an undecidable
sentence of PA.
4.3 Gödel’s Second Theorem
Thanks to Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem, we know that there are unprovable «arithmetical truths».
Is consistency of PA one of them?
First, notice that, since Neg and Pf are recursive, Neg is representable in PA by a wff Neg(x1, x2) and Pf
is expressible in PA by a wff Pf(x1, x2). Now let Con(PA) be the sentence ∀ x1 ∀ x2 ∀ x3 ∀ x4 ¬(Pf(x1, x3)∧
Pf(x2, x4) ∧Neg(x3, x4)), which asserts (in the standard interpretation) that there are no proofs in PA of a
wff and its negation, i.e. that PA is consistent.
1For this proof, we use consistency and ω-consistency of PA, but there is another proof, due to Rosser, that uses only the
consistency of PA. see Proposition 3.36 of [Mendelson].
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We have Gödel’s Second Theorem: Con(PA) is unprovable in PA, i.e. PA can not prove its own
consistency (see Proposition 3.40 of [Mendelson]).
4.4 Church’s Thesis
Church’s Thesis is a definition of «algorithm», that can be stated as «to solve algorithmically a problem
is equivalent to find a recursive relation which models such problem», or simply «‘algorithmic’ is equivalent
to ‘recursive’».
Keeping this idea, given an extension E of PA:
• E is a axiomatic iff {n ∈ N | there is an axiom α of E such that n = G(α)} is recursive.
Notice that:
◦ Assuming Church’s thesis, E is axiomatic iff it is possible to define an algorithm which can decide
if a wff is an axiom of E.
◦ PA is axiomatic, since PrAx is recursive.
• E is algorithmically axiomatizable iff there is an axiomatic extension F of PA such that the theorems
of F are exactly the theorems of E.
It is clear that every axiomatic extension is algorithmically axiomatizable, it suffices to assume F := E.
• E is recursively decidable iff {n ∈ N | there is a theorem α of E such that n = G(α)} is recursive.
Notice that:
◦ Assuming Church’s thesis, E is recursively decidable iff it is possible to find an algorithm which
can decide whether a sentence is a theorem of E.
◦ It is clear that if E is recursively decidable, E is axiomatic.
Why we said that the answer to the Entscheidungsproblem is negative?
The reason is Church’s Theorem: KL is not recursively decidable (see Proposition 3.52 of [Mendelson]).
Is PA recursively decidable?
No, PA is not recursively decidable.
Proof
• Let TPA be the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of PA.
• TPA is not expressible in PA. Indeed:
◦ Assume that TPA is expressible in PA by a wff τ(x1).
◦ By the Fixed Point Theorem, there is a sentence S such that `PA S ↔ ¬τ(G(S)).
∗ Case `PA S
· `PA S ⇒ G(S) ∈ TPA τ expresses TPA⇒ `PA τ(G(S)). [1]
·
 `PA S ↔ ¬τ(G(S))`PA SBiconditional Elimination
 ⇒ `PA ¬τ(G(S)) [1]⇒ PA is inconsistent, a contradic-
tion.
∗ Case 0PA S
· 0PA S ⇒ G(S) /∈ TPA τ expresses TPA⇒ `PA ¬τ(G(S))
{
`PA S ↔ ¬τ(G(S))
Biconditional Elimination
}
⇒ `PA S,
a contradiction.
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• Thus, TPA is not recursive, since every recursive relation is expressible in PA.

As we said before, V is useless, impracticable, since V is not recursively axiomatizable: if it were, then
the same reasoning used in Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem would lead us to the conclusion that V is
incomplete, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, assuming Church Thesis, it is impossible to find an algorithm which can decide whether a
given sentence of arithmetic is true or not.
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